Aviation Week & Space Technology
October 22, 2001

Tough Decisions Loom For EA-6B Replacement

By Robert Wall, Washington

Senior Pentagon officials face a number of difficult choices and expensive options as they try to determine in the coming weeks how to replace the EA-6B Prowler support jammer.

A Pentagon-chartered analysis of electronic attack alternatives has been completed after more than a year's study and military officials have been presented with a laundry list of options to maintain a support-jamming capability past 2010. Now, the Defense Dept. has to determine how it wants to proceed. Officials familiar with the closely-held assessment note there are many difficult battles ahead because of the future program's significant costs.

THE DRIVING FACTOR behind the study is the growing need to begin development of a replacement for the EA-6B. The Navy has 124 of the aircraft, but that number is expected to drop through age and attrition. The critical crossover point is expected to come in mid-2008, when the Pentagon is projected to drop below its minimum inventory of 108 aircraft, said Cdr. David Woods, the Navy's requirements officer for the Prowler.

The analysis showed that "all the solutions came out very expensive. Nothing went easy," said one senior industry official. That has frustrated some officers. Moreover, there is consternation that the evaluation didn't lead to a single solution, but instead presented six case studies, each with up to 10 different excursions to assess the effectiveness of various systems.

The laundry list of systems being considered includes building new Prowlers, called the EA-6C; putting a jamming suite on fighters such as the F/A-18E/F, F-15, Joint Strike Fighter or F-22; using business jets, and moving to large Boeing 737- or 767-class aircraft. Unmanned aircraft and expendable systems, such as a Mald-Jammer, are seen as adjuncts to almost any manned aircraft selected. A 6,000-lb. payload version of the Global Hawk unmanned aircraft did particularly well, industry officials said.

The Navy and Boeing had put their hope on an electronic warfare version of the F/A-18F, called the F/A-18G and nicknamed "Growler." But the cost of developing and fielding such a system was among the highest of the different options, reaching $48 billion, said one industry official. Developing a new electronic warfare suite, rather than using the Improved Capability-3 system currently in development, drove up the cost projection. The per-aircraft price would exceed $100 million, the official contended. Moreover, another added, the assessment found the F/A-18G would be significantly different from the "F"-model, requiring a new flight certification program. Fielding a new aircraft could therefore take 10 years, he added.

The Air Force, for its part, isn't convinced it needs a support jamming aircraft. "I don't know yet," says Gen. John Jumper, Air Force chief of staff.

Instead, fighters with active electronically scanned arrays may be sufficient to protect strike aircraft, Jumper said. Those arrays can be used as high-power, narrow-beam jammers in addition to their radar function, which Jumper believes may provide adequate protection. Industry officials dispute that notion, though, noting that the array designed for radar functions can't produce adequate jamming power.

After the Kosovo air war in 1999, the Air Force considered a near-term effort to field a standoff jamming system on the B-52 or B-1B. But those ideas are no longer getting serious attention, an aerospace industry official said.

As a long-term solution, some USAF officials were arguing for jammers on the F-22. But that option got a poor reception from the study group, largely due to the aircraft's high acquisition cost, the industry official says. Furthermore, hanging transmitters under the wing would negate the aircraft's stealth performance, and its system for internal carriage was deemed both more expensive and less capable.

AMONG THE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT options, JSF appears to have fared the best. The nonrecurring spending to develop the jammer version is estimated at about $2.2 billion. That would include the cost of developing a two-seat aircraft, which assessment members maintain is needed for the support jamming role. The up-front cost is about the same as for other fighter-based jamming systems, but the projected low acquisition and support costs make the total bill much lower using JSF, one official added.

The business-jet approach fared better. An industry official noted that "they could have a role, but not by themselves" because they cannot operate very close to the target. To be effective, the business jet would need to feature an entirely new electronic warfare suite capable of very precisely identifying what frequencies it needs to disrupt, in order to focus its jamming energy. Aircraft that are closer in could jam entire sub-bands. Another added that installing such a suite would be possible. For instance, using the high-band signals intelligence system the Air Force is developing would allow the radar frequency to be precisely identified and jammed. Moreover, the business jet could also take on the communications jamming role of the EC-130H Compass Call.

The range-to-target problem is more severe for the 737- or 767-like airplane, industry officials say. The large aircraft would operate at relatively large distances from enemy radar. "They are not very effective from way out there," the official said, and would require immense power output to effectively suppress a radar. "None of the multi-mission airplanes came out looking very well," he added.

THE EA-6C OPTION would entail building new aircraft using current upgrades and eliminating maintenance problems. For instance, it could involve replacing the current engine with a General Electric F404. A new radar and flight control system also would be included. Cost estimates for restarting production vary widely, from a low of $100 million to up to $800 million.

What happens with the future aircraft isn't the only concern for Pentagon planners. The EA-6B fleet has enjoyed strong political support since it became the backbone of the Pentagon's airborne jamming support after the Air Force retired its EF-111s. "My fear is that the focus shifts to the follow-on aircraft" at the expense of the EA-6B when a new platform is selected, Woods said. He noted that the EA-6B will continue to require attention even when development of a replacement has begun. To counter the fear of losing political support, Woods emphasized that any upgrades funded for the EA-6B's electronic warfare suite would benefit the future platform.

The Navy is finding that the current fleet is aging faster than projected, leading to more stringent g-force restrictions. The rate of aging "is not going to get any better," Woods noted.