Aviation Week & Space Technology
October 15, 2001

Taliban Air Defenses Target U.S. Weakness

By Robert Wall, Washington

Although the Taliban doesn't have sophisticated air defenses and has seen most of its systems destroyed during the first few days of the air campaign, some of the remaining low-altitude surface-to-air missile systems target U.S. pilots where they are most vulnerable, electronic warfare officials fear.

The lack of an integrated air defense in Afghanistan has allowed the U.S. to operate with smaller strike packages than normal because fewer support aircraft suppressing air defenses are needed to protect bomb-dropping airplanes. On the other hand, the Taliban's infrared-guided missile threat is encumbering U.S. air operations, forcing high-altitude food drops and combat operations (see p. 32).

There is concern that the primitive air defenses could lead to allied complacency. The threat "is not very daunting" so there is a risk "we may let our guard down," warned Rep. Mark S. Kirk (R-Ill.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee and an air intelligence officer for a reserve unit of EA-6B Prowlers.

All air raids so far have been mandated to operate with EA-6B jamming support to reduce risk to the strike aircraft. Without an EA-6B, a mission would be canceled, one official said. That dictum was implemented during the Kosovo air war, but senior military officials believe it is prudent to keep it in place. The Prowlers' primary assignment has been jamming, rather than firing Harm antiradar missiles.

Despite the relatively crude radar threat, U.S. planners took steps in advance of the conflict to prepare electronic warfare gear to properly handle Afghani radars and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Among the measures was a series of enhancements to the EA-6B Prowler for improved radar jamming.

Additionally, the EA-6B's communications jamming capability has been given a boost. The ability to disrupt Taliban operations using the USQ-113 communications jammer is expected to play an important part in the air campaign and could be more valuable on a day-to-day basis than the more traditional radar jamming role, a Pentagon official said. In addition to some last-minute enhancements, the USQ-113 has for several months undergone fixes to problems identified during the Kosovo air war.

About half the upgrades made as a quick response in preparation for the on-going air campaign are focused on enhancing radar jamming. The other half are meant to enhance the disruption of enemy communications.

Moreover, VAQ-137, the EA-6B squadron on the USS Theodore Roosevelt, which is in theater, is the first to deploy with night vision goggles (NVGs). The upgrade came as a result of lessons learned during the Kosovo air war. The night vision capability enhances the crews' situational awareness, said Rear Adm. Evan Chanik, who heads Navy aviation plans and requirements. The NVGs allow crew to better see other aircraft in the strike package and find refueling tankers, something that proved difficult during the Kosovo campaign. Although VAQ-137 was not involved in the first days of strikes, its aircraft could see action as the Pentagon expands its war effort.

Among the first targets for U.S. strike aircraft were early-warning radars and the few known air defense sites with radar-guided weapons. It took the Pentagon a couple of days to eliminate the Taliban's high-altitude air defense threat. By the third day of air operations, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld declared the U.S. had gained air superiority--at least as long as aircraft remained outside the range of antiaircraft artillery and IR-guided missiles. Nevertheless, at least three SAM sites were attacked again during the third day of the air campaign.

Most of the Taliban's air defense efforts have involved antiaircraft artillery and heat-seeking missiles, said USAF Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Officials warn the infrared threat in particular is something U.S. pilots are ill-equipped to counter. Almost all U.S. combat aircraft lost since 1980 have fallen victim to IR-guided missiles, contends Ray Sweeny, a retired Air Force electronic warfare (EW) officer who still is active in the field.

One of the biggest problems is the lack of missile warning equipment that could detect IR-guided missile launches and alert the pilot, said Maj. Gen. (ret.) John A. Corder, who is overseeing the Pentagon's Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives. He expressed frustration that more than 10 years after this type of equipment was tested it still isn't widely fielded.

The concern was echoed by Rep. Joseph R. Pitts. (R-Pa.), a former B-52 EW officer who established an EW advocacy group in Congress. "Our air forces do not have adequate missile warning systems," he stressed.

Special operations forces are slightly better equipped, featuring both warning gear and countermeasures devices, one industry official noted. However, regular transports and helicopters that could be needed in a sustained campaign are extremely vulnerable.

Sweeny contends there will never be enough money to proliferate missile warning gear across helicopters, fighters and transports. Instead, he is advocating development of an infrared countermeasures pod that doesn't require cueing from a missile warning system. B-1Bs operating from Diego Garcia already have a towed decoy that is reeled out and transmits a signal to attract radar-guided SAMs.

The infrared pod would dispense a rapidly oxidizing material before entering a threat area. The oxidization produces a heat source to create a sustained target. In contrast, flares quickly fade and their supply is usually limited. The chemicals would be mixed so the decoy could be detected only by a heat-seeking missile and not by air defense operators on the ground, who otherwise would be alerted to the aircraft's presence and be able to target it. An initial demonstration was completed earlier this year using an A-10 at Eglin AFB, Fla. The infrared source, essentially a small piece of treated foil, was dispensed from a modified LAU-68 rocket launcher. A second demonstration is planned for later this year using a near-production representative pod configuration.

The Pentagon has several other systems on the drawing board that should help it address the IR threat. Among them is the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures program, which is supposed to provide C-17s, C-130s and C-5s with a laser-based defense against IR-guided missiles. The Air Force late last month awarded Northrop Grumman a $66-million contract to develop the system and install it on two C-17s and one C-130, with options for 10 more C-17s and seven more C-130 shipsets. Raytheon and BAE Systems also competed.

More advanced self-protection systems also are in development. Among them is the closed-loop infrared countermeasures system that uses a laser to determine what type of IR missile is approaching and then defeats it using a complex, synchronized jam code.

Yet another concern for the Air Force should be the aging of its jamming pods, Sweeny said. He lamented that the service's $2-billion investment on about 1,300 of these systems is withering because they aren't being sufficiently upgraded. Since 1996, the Air Force has been spending about $5 million a year to modernize those systems, but $30-40 million is needed. If the situation doesn't change, he warned that the service's electronic countermeasure pods "will become $2 billion of electronic junk."