Aviation Week & Space Technology
March 26, 2001
Pg. 31

Navy's EW Program Comes Under Fire

By Robert Wall, Washington

The Navy may face a difficult time meeting operational availability requirements for its F/A-18E/F's self-protection gear, and could have greater aircraft losses as a result of changes the service made to the strike fighter's electronic warfare requirements, according to a report by the Pentagon's Inspector General.

The IG has questioned both the configuration and reliability for the Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (Idecm) system. The $2.7-billion program, which is designed primarily for the F/A-18E/F, will also be used by the Air Force's F-15 and B-1B bomber.

IN A NEW REPORT, the IG contends that the Navy relaxed mission reliability requirements, which ''will have a significant impact on operations and maintenance costs.'' However, the report also shows that because of the change, the Navy may have more aircraft shot down than would be the case if a higher reliability requirement were maintained.

A cost and operational effectiveness assessment conducted for the Pentagon at the outset of the program indicated that lower reliability could lead to significant increases in the number of aircraft lost in combat. The Navy, in its response to the IG, acknowledged that to be the case, although it played down the significance of the increased attrition rate. Using a scenario of 110 strike sorties, the Navy plotted aircraft shoot-downs based on varying levels of mean times between critical equipment failure. The model showed that changing reliability requirements makes the aircraft indeed more vulnerable.

''Although this is an increase of 7%, in terms of aircraft losses over 110 sorties, the actual number is quite small,'' the Navy maintained. The number of aircraft losses is classified. The IG concurred with the Navy's overall assessment, noting the changes in aircraft lost were ''slight.'' In fact, the IG largely ignored the issue, focusing instead on other impacts the reliability changes will have on the program.

The debate over equipment reliability harks back to the squabbling at the Pentagon over Idecm's predecessor, the ALQ-165 Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) that was eventually terminated and then resuscitated by the Pentagon in a limited fashion when the Navy confronted a self-protection shortfall.

The references to ASPJ are particularly relevant since the ALQ-165 will serve as an interim jammer on F/A-18E/Fs until Idecm's ALQ-214 radio-frequency countermeasures subsystem is developed. Furthermore, the ALQ-214 has about 60% commonality with ASPJ. A primary reason ASPJ failed its original operational test was reliability, although many EW officials contend the test was unfair and that established goals were impossible to meet.

The Navy's Idecm plan calls for the first two F/A-18E/F deployments to feature the ALQ-165 and the ALE-50 repeater towed decoy. The system will then be upgraded with the ALQ-214 and later get the ALE-55 Fiber-Optic Towed Decoy that can broadcast more sophisticated countermeasures signals.

The IG highlights changes the Navy has made in test requirements between the original ASPJ specification and the on-board jammers for Idecm. Mission reliability has been decreased from 95% to 86%, probability of correct detection has decreased to 80% from 90%, time for corrective maintenance in case of operational mission failures has ballooned from 45 min. to 120 min., and false alarm rate demands for built-in-test were relaxed. Idecm using both the ALQ-165 and ALQ-214 jammers will be tested against the lower set of requirements.

The mission reliability was reduced because the Navy expanded the amount of equipment that it factors in during testing. Originally, only the techniques generator, towed decoy and signal conditioning assembly were included. But in response to concern from the test community, that equipment set was expanded to include the onboard transmitter and other components. As a result, the system would not have been able to meet the 94% threshold, and it was reduced, the IG said.

THE NAVY DISAGREES. It maintains that the performance level was reduced as a result of systems engineering analysis. Furthermore, the requirement for the core EW gear was not reduced. The IG indicated that the crucial question is if the Navy can meet its overarching objective of having Idecm operationally available 90% of the time. That is possible, the IG said. But, he added, ''we do not believe that the Navy will be willing to fund the additional maintenance actions and obtain the spare parts needed'' to reach that level, degrading the system's effectiveness.

Furthermore, the IG argues the Navy should consider eliminating the system's onboard transmitters, relying only on the fiber-optic towed decoy. That is seen as a more cost-effective solution than the Navy's current strategy.

Currently, the ALQ-214 jammer will stimulate both the towed decoy and onboard transmitters.The latter will cost $450,000 per system. The Navy plans to buy 366 for a cost of $165 million. That money could be saved, the IG contends, while acknowledging the transmitters would provide additional protection.

The Navy contends there are valuable operational benefits. They include being able to defeat threat systems that operate outside the radio-frequency range of the towed decoy, having a self-protection capability in case of decoy failure and having EW coverage after one decoy is ''shot down'' before the second is deployed.

But the IG isn't the only one to criticize the Navy's Idecm plan. Tony Grieco, the Pentagon's top EW official, chastised the service for underfunding the program. Although the service has a need to put a self-protection suite on each aircraft, it is planning to buy only two for every three aircraft, he noted. On top of that, it isn't even adequately funding those buys. ''We are not buying enough systems and not buying them fast enough,'' Grieco noted. Furthermore, he added, rather than buying 30 towed decoys per F/A-18E/F, the Navy is funding only 12.

ADDITIONALLY, the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation, in his annual report to Congress, noted that the Navy continues to have problems integrating the fiber-optic towed decoy on the F/A-18E/F. The service has been struggling to find a way to install the system without having the engine plume degrade the towline. Tests to better assess the environment ''showed unexplained temperature spikes in the towline,'' the test report states. New materials and a new reel-out, reel-in mechanism for the decoy are being investigated. Nevertheless, the effort is still classified as ''high risk,'' the report says.

The test community also faulted the Navy for not providing enough logistics support for ASPJ. With critical tests still to take place on Idecm Block 2 hardware, which will replace ASPJ, there is some uncertainty whether the new equipment will be ready before logistics support for the existing jammer runs out.