Navy News & Undersea Technology
July 24, 2000
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Congressional Member Says Emphasize Electronic Warfare In Next QDR

By Lisa Troshinsky

The Department of Defense should remove Electronic Warfare (EW) from under the umbrella of Information Operations (IO) so that EW can gain additional funding and focus, said Rep. Joseph Pitts, R-Pa., House Armed Services Committee, last week at a Capitol Hill forum on the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The conference was sponsored by the Lexington Institute, a Washington, D.C., think tank.

"The next QDR provides an excellent opportunity to address a new America’s EW program," Rep. Pitts said. "We need to remove EW from under the umbrella of Information Operations and make it again its own distinct program."

"I believe it would be beneficial to reestablish a ‘Center for Excellence’ exclusively for EW programs—a hub of expertise for EW within the Pentagon," he continued. "If we do not separate EW from IO, we risk losing our focus on EW and it may never receive the necessary attention or funding from the Pentagon or Congress."

The fact that EW is under IO is a "complaint that has cropped up in several meetings with EW experts," a congressional source told Navy News. "In the last QDR ... while EW was important, it got lost in the fray when [DoD] talked about reconnaissance or surveillance. But there are aspects that might cause separation [of EW from IO] to be difficult— operational concerns." The lack of support jamming capability—one aspect of EW—was made painfully apparent during the Kosovo War, when the Navy had to pull EA-6B Prowlers from all corners of the globe to protect the aircraft in the predominantly air campaign war.

"It was clear from the Joint Command in Operation Allied Force that they wouldn’t fly any aircraft without support jamming," the congressional source said. ‘It’s an unstated requirement that the United States doesn’t want to lose any aircraft or lives. We lost two planes in Kosovo—both losses were attributable to a lack of support jamming coverage. We also know that self protection of jammers saved several aircraft."

Multi-Layer EW Strategy Needed

Rep. Pitts said that the next QDR, due out next year, should encompass a multi-layer EW strategy. That the Air Force’s reliance on stealth—the ability of aircraft to avoid detection by deceiving enemy radar—should not be continued to be used as a revolutionary alternative to EW, but only as part of the service’s entire EW strategy. In other words, the burden of jamming shouldn’t be left to the Navy, especially considering the average Prowler is 20 years old.

"Electromagnetic dominance relies on the effective use of low observables, by that I mean stealth; suppression of enemy air defenses; support jamming; and aircraft self-protection measures," Rep. Pitts said.

According to Pitts, who has established an EW Working Group, the Pentagon must produce a new airframe for support jamming, and must resist temptation to delay the deployment of the next-generation support jammer, called ICAP-3, until a new airframe for support jamming is produced. He also said the Air Force must redefine its role in support jamming; and an additional layer of EW technology should be provided to ensure aircraft survivability—radio frequency and infrared self-protection, including laser Directed IR Countermeasures.

Funds For EW In Fiscal 2001 Defense Bill

Though DoD has neglected EW over the last six years, since the Gulf War, new funds exist in the fiscal 2001 defense conference bill, recently passed by the House. But still, the conferees didn’t allow for as much funding as did the administration for EA-6 modifications. The president’s bill asked for $203 million for the EA-6 series; the conference bill allowed $189 million. A decrease of $16.8 million existed in the final bill for a Premature ICAP III Training System. The conference bill contained $3 million more than did the administration’s bill for an EA-6B Block 89A Ready Room Mission Rehearsal System.

According to a congressional source, new funds exist in the conference bill for EA-6B maintenance, a new EA-6B automatic flight control system, that will help with navigation; EW decoys, and Research and Development funds for EW Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles.

Other QDR Sentiments

Other members of Congress, top military officials and industry representatives stressed the importance of developing a strategy-based, as opposed to a budget-driven QDR. Defense analysts say the 1997, budget-driven QDR resulted in the services being shortchanged in resources and funds. Some also question the first QDR’s strategy goal of the United States being able to fight two consecutive major theater wars (MTW), citing lack of funding and the fact the two MTW strategy doesn’t take into consideration the contingency operations the United States has been involved in since the end of the Cold War.

"A two major war strategy is a good strategy, but we don’t have the sized force or the resources to carry out that strategy," said Chairman, House Armed Services Commit- tee, Rep. Floyd Spence at last week’s Lexington Institute conference. "The Joint Chiefs said we can do it, but that it’d be risky. The latest is that it would be high risk. We have to come up with a different QDR to make for our mistakes. But I’m sure the budget will still have a lot to do with the size of our force."

Dr. Gordon Adams, director of Security Policy Studies at George Washington University, criticized basing a QDR on the two MTW scenario.

"We need to get the environment right," Adams said. "We need to prepare against real missions, not artificial scenarios. Two MTWs is a mechanical artifact. We need to define real requirements in those regions."

Adams also stressed that unlike the last QDR, this one should build in language to ensure trans-Atlantic dialogue to insure interoperability with U.S. allies.

Phil Odeen, TRW’s executive vice president, said the new QDR should "look beyond the two MTW strategy" because it is "not realistic to DoD’s size force. We don’t have the right kind of forces today; we need a new approach to handle a series of other missions," he said.

"This QDR should look 10 to 20 years into the future, and produce two alternative forces—one larger than the recommended force and one smaller than the recommended force," said Sen. Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., Armed Services Committee.