Aviation Week & Space Technology
April 29, 2002
Pg. 55

War Expansion May Require New Operational Techniques

By Robert Wall, Washington

If the U.S. war on terrorism expands to countries such as Iraq, Navy aviators expect to need new ways to handle pop-up targets if they want to duplicate the success they've had in Afghanistan.

Most strikes during the Afghan war have been against emerging targets, not planned, fixed sites. But military strategists realize that attacking those fleeting targets is difficult because it requires a quick response. "We've got to do a much better job with time-critical targeting," said Vice Adm. John B. Nathman, commander of Naval Air Forces.

Limitations in Afghanistan were overcome by coordinating with special operations ground forces. Those troops could identify and locate targets for attack and radio coordinates to strike aircraft loitering overhead. But other schemes may be necessary as the U.S. war effort spreads, particularly into higher threat environments.

Nathman said "I don't think we're going to get boots on the ground like that in Iraq." That means new methods have to be devised since the White House clearly is considering military action against Baghdad, he noted.

The problem the military faces is that decisions have been delegated to higher command authorities, which slows the ability to respond when a new target is detected. "I think we need to put [the decision authority] back into the cockpit if we are going to enable time-critical strike," Nathman said.

One idea is to provide pilots with target imagery directly from surveillance assets, such as the Predator UAV, or at least accurate target coordinates from that intelligence, he said.

Navy aviators point to statistics they say show the success against fleeting targets in the Afghanistan campaign. About 80% of Navy strikes were against such time-critical targets, said Rear Adm. Matthew G. Moffit, the service's head of aviation plans and requirements. Planned raids were largely limited to the first few days of combat operations. However, the Navy experienced targeting bottlenecks. For instance, Moffit said at times airborne strike aircraft were stacked up waiting for targets to be identified so they could attack them.

In reviewing their war exploits, Navy officials say they hit at least one target in 84% of their strike missions. Ninety-three percent of the ordnance used were precision or near-precision weapons. On average, each strike aircraft hit two targets per mission.

ANOTHER IMPROVEMENT the Navy is interested in is a small, precision weapon, Nathman told a Lexington Institute naval forum. The Air Force already is pursuing development of a small weapon, called the Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB). Although SDB is not a joint program, there is the expectation among Defense Dept. officials that the Navy eventually would join such an effort, said Ron Mutzelburg, deputy director for air warfare in the Pentagon's acquisition office.

But Navy officials believe their sister service is on the wrong course. They deem the Air Force program too expansive and too expensive since it is developing a munition that is being tailored to fit into the F-22's weapons bays. The Navy doesn't have a size contraint and therefore can make do with a less expensive solution, said Nathman. Essentially, Navy officials want a 250-lb. version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition, a GPS-guidance tailkit that could be applied to regular bombs, rather than an entirely new design. Developing SDB would take longer than the Navy wants to wait.

But to achieve decent effectiveness with the smaller weapon "you've got to get really accurate," Nathman said. The Navy wants to put a seeker on the bomb that would have a limited automatic target recognition capability.

The war, so far, also has left the Navy struggling with other problems. As was the case after the 1999 Kosovo war, the number of operationally available EA-6B support jamming aircraft has been reduced significantly; the service has about 85 Prowlers it can call on, down from 102. The shortage is causing Navy officials to move aircraft around to avoid gaps.

After Kosovo, the Navy, with help from Congress, was able to increase the inventory level to more than 100 EA-6Bs, but Nathman doesn't think that will happen this time. "We have lost the ability to reconstitute that airframe." And, he said, "I strongly believe we are going to see more bad news on the horizon." He urged Congress to support the EA-6B follow-on project, the EA-18, and to field it quickly. "We need it now," he added.

Moreover, Nathman rejected the idea that future strike fighters with active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, which can be used for spot-beam jamming, reduce the need for dedicated support jamming aircraft. Air Force officials have indicated they believe the proliferation of AESA radars will allow the service to forgo a dedicated electronic warfare aircraft. But Nathman said strike pilots will be busy with other missions. The spot jamming also won't provide broad enough coverage, he noted, nor does it sustain electronic attack tactics and expertise across the service. Moreover, the fire control radars usually don't operate in the frequencies needed to jam enemy air defenses, an industry official added.

Nathman also defended some of the Navy's more contentious initiatives including plans to cut F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike Fighter procurement, and a move to replace the S-3 with the F/A-18E/F for carrier-based refueling. The former, he said, merely represented a "realistic assessment" of the service's requirements. Additionally, he said that with the Marine Corps integrated more closely into carrier aviation, it makes sense for the service to buy Navy versions of the Joint Strike Fighter. The Marines should buy only short takeoff and vertical landing models for its amphibious assault ships, he said.

Concerning the S-3 retirement, Nathman said the F/A-18E/F would do a better job refueling strike aircraft. In Afghanistan, strike aircraft refueled by S-3s had to descend to 17,000 ft. By the time the F/A-18s and F-14s descended, refueled and returned to their operating altitude they consumed almost as much fuel as they took on, he said. The Super Hornet tanker wouldn't have that drawback, he added.