Defense News
August 7, 2000
Pg. 1

Poor Management Plagues EW Programs

By Robert Holzer, Defense News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Rapid obsolescence, delays in new programs and cost overruns plague the U.S. military’s electronic warfare (EW) systems, according to a new Pentagon study that calls for new oversight of EW programs across the Department of Defense.

"The primarily disappointing history of EW development programs … is a sad testimonial to the lack of commitment and priority given to these programs and to the astounding inability of the institutions involved to learn from their past mistakes and to take aggressive action to avoid repeating them," the study concludes.

The situation is so bleak that a group of congressmen is demanding hearings in September to address the state of EW within the Pentagon. In a June 21 letter to Rep. Floyd Spence, R-S.C., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 28 congressmen, led by Rep. Joseph Pitts, R-Pa., urge hearings on the state of Pentagon EW capabilities.

"The Pentagon must adopt and commit themselves to an across-the-board development of EW assets and capabilities," Pitts said in a July 20 meeting sponsored by the Lexington Institute here. "EW programs in each branch of our armed forces must become more visible and receive a higher degree of attention by the Pentagon."

Such concerns prompted Jacques Gansler, Pentagon acquisition chief, to launch a department-wide review of EW late last year.

A study team, led by Peter Lennon, director for acquisition resources and analysis, is now proposing a series or recommendations for Gansler’s approval, Pentagon sources said.

Specifically, Lennon’s team urges the creation of a new Department of Defense EW Oversight Panel, composed of a director for EW within Gansler’s office, plus new EW positions in each of the services, according to a draft copy of Lennon’s recommendations.

The panel would report directly to Gansler and his deputy. Funding of $4 million to $5 million a year should be allocated for this group’s work, according to Lennon’s recommendations.

The recommendations were briefed to Gansler in late-June, said Air Force Col. Grant Herring, co-chair of the EW review team. Gansler directed additional analysis, but generally supported the recommendations, Herring said, noting that the study should be completed by mid-August.

Last year’s air campaign by NATO in Kosovo underscored the importance of EW to U.S. forces, given that all aircraft, including stealth aircraft like the Air Force’s B-2 bomber and F-117 fighter, required electronic support and jamming for every mission.

The United States’ fleet of EW aircraft is aging and in short supply, while new generations of aircraft-mounted jammers and self-defense systems remain stuck in the development pipeline, according to the study.

"I am very concerned over the state of EW. We are behind the threat right now," said retired Rear Adm. Grady Jackson, the last Navy admiral responsible for EW programs. "They haven’t been used against us yet, but at some point they will."

According to a copy of the EW Programs Management Study, Lennon’s team assessed 19 different EW programs from the Army, Navy and Air Force and interviewed more than 60 different people regarding the problems that plague development of their EW programs.

The problems include:

*Inattention to software development.

*A rapidly changing threat which forces costly redesign of systems.

*Fluctuating budgets.

*Lax oversight by senior leaders.

These all have contributed to the poor development history of EW programs during the last decade, the study concludes, by driving up program costs and delaying the fielding of EW systems.

For example, the Army’s Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System should have cost $69.8 million to develop in 17 months. But as of Sept. 30, 1999, it is now projected to cost $179.8 million and take 47 months to deliver.

Similarly, the Navy’s Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures system is projected to cost $176.7 million and 25 months to develop instead of the original estimate of $74.2 million and 17 months, according to the study.

Regarding the formation of new stand-alone EW offices in each service, the study says each should generate a service-wide perspective on EW to avoid the creation of narrowly-defined programs developing in isolation from one another.

"An EW advocate ensures EW programs will be funded," Jackson said. "He can fight for science and technology dollars for EW like any other program."

Moreover, the senior Oversight Panel would review service EW plans at least once a year and assess them in light of the latest intelligence information and budget situation.

Whether these changes will be helpful or simply add another layer of bureaucracy in the Pentagon is unclear, other EW experts said.

"I just don’t see this as anything useful," said Zeke Zardeskas, a defense consultant and former head of Navy airborne EW programs. "The tools are there; what is not there is the money and the interest on the part of the services."

Other recommendations in the study include:

*Development of a detailed EW Roadmap stating future EW technology requirements, status of systems in development and EW interoperability requirements among the military services.

*Creation of a $6 million to $10 million government/industry program to further the education, training and career development of the nation’s EW work force.

*Develop more and better analytical tools for EW, including modeling and simulation.